

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI				
2	DDCI				
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI				
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	VC/NIC				
16	C/LA/DO		X		
17	C/CATF/DO		X 2		
18	NIO/LA		X 3		
19	D/ALA/DI		X 4		
20					
21					
22					
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

18 OCT 85

Date

3637 (10-81)



STAT



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 17, 1985

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
(WITH SECRET ATTACHMENTS)

Executive Registry

85-
3900

MEMORANDUM TO:

D	-	Mr. Whitehead
P	-	Mr. Armacost
E	-	Mr. Wallis
T	-	Mr. Schneider
M	-	Mr. Spiers
C	-	Mr. Derwinski
AF	-	Mr. Crocker
ARA	-	Mr. Abrams
CA	-	Ms. Clark
EAP	-	Mr. Wolfowitz
EB	-	Mr. McMinn
EUR	-	Ms. Ridgway
H	-	Mr. Ball
HA	-	Mr. Moser
INM	-	Mr. Thomas
INR	-	Mr. Abramowitz
IO	-	Mr. Newell
L	-	Judge Sofaer
NEA	-	Mr. Murphy
OES	-	Mr. Negroponte
PA	-	Mr. Kalb
PM	-	Mr. Holmes
RP	-	Mr. Purcell
S/NP	-	Mr. Kennedy
S/P	-	Mr. Rodman
AID	-	Mr. Richard Meyer
CIA	-	
INR/B	-	Mr. Peter Hirsch
USIA	-	Mr. William LaSalle

STAT

SUBJECT: Requirements for Mr. Whitehead's trip to Central America, November 6-9, 1985

TRIP COORDINATOR: Richard Melton, ARA/CEN, Room 4915, 632-4010

DEPUTY COORDINATOR: Bill Wood, ARA/CEN, Room 4915, 632-8148

ECONOMIC ISSUES: Ward Barmon, ARA/EPC, Room 3234, 632-3341

S/S-S ACTION OFFICER: Edward T. Smith, Room 7241, 632-1522
Angus Simmons (Alternate)

This memorandum assigns responsibilities for the preparation of briefing materials for use by Deputy Secretary Whitehead during his trip to Central America. Bureaus wishing to suggest additions or changes to this tasker should contact the S/S-S Action Officer as soon as possible.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DCI
EXEC
REG

- 2 -

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

I. COUNTRY SCOPE PAPERS: ARA should prepare scope papers, in the form of briefing memoranda from the Assistant Secretary (sample attached), for each country Mr. Whitehead will visit. The papers should address the following questions: 1) Where does our relationship stand? 2) What do we want to accomplish with this visit? 3) What does the country visited want from us? 4) What can we realistically hope to achieve? The papers should be cleared by P, S/P and other bureaus as appropriate. All scope papers are due in S/S-S by COB October 25.

II. SCHEDULE: ARA should work closely with the Embassies involved to prepare an overall schedule for the trip for inclusion in the briefing book. This overall schedule should be kept as short as possible, without going into scenario-like detail. In addition, ARA should prepare annotated daily schedules for Mr. Whitehead's use. The schedules are due in S/S-S by COB October 29.

III. BRIEFING MEMORANDA: ARA should prepare a briefing outline for each meeting scheduled. The briefing outlines should use the standard format (sample attached), and should be cleared with P, S/P, and other bureaus as appropriate. All briefing outlines are due in S/S-S by COB October 28. Meetings tentatively scheduled are:

HONDURAS

1. President Suazo
2. Foreign Minister Paz Barnica
3. Political Candidates

EL SALVADOR

4. President Duarte
5. Foreign Minister Castillo
6. Military High Command
7. Minister of Planning Chavez Mena
8. Salvadoran Private Sector Representatives.

COSTA RICA

9. President Monge
10. Foreign Minister Gutierrez
11. Political Candidates
12. Out-of-Country Ambassadors
13. Economic leaders

GUATEMALA

14. Chief of Government Mejia
15. Foreign Minister Andrade
16. Political Candidates

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-3-

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

IV. FACT SHEETS: The following Fact Sheets should be prepared on State Department Briefing Paper (black top) letterhead. Fact Sheets should normally be one page in length, and must not exceed two pages (sample attached). They should be delivered as a complete package to S/S-S, with the required clearances (including at least DAS level in the drafting bureau), by COB October 25.

<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>DRAFT</u>	<u>CLEAR</u>
<u>El Salvador</u>		
1. Political Developments	ARA	P
2. Economic Developments (including reforms, US assistance, and debt situation)	ARA	P, EB, E, AID
3. Human Rights (including judicial reform and US citizen cases)	ARA	P, HA
4. Military Situation (including terrorism and U.S. assistance)	ARA	P, PM, M/CTP
5. Foreign Affairs (including Contadora, U.N. and border issues)	ARA	P, IO
<u>Guatemala</u>		
1. Foreign Affairs	ARA	P
2. Human Rights	ARA	P, HA
3. Elections	ARA	P
4. Military Situation (including insurgency)	ARA	P, PM
5. Economic Problems/Prospects (including debt situation)	ARA	P, EB, E
<u>Honduras</u>		
1. Nicaraguan Resistance (including role of NHAO)	ARA	P
2. Political Developments (including elections)	ARA	P
3. Economic Developments (including U.S. aid, and debt situation)	ARA	P, EB, E, AID
4. Relations with U.S. (including U.S. military presence)	ARA	P, PM
5. Foreign Affairs (including Contadora, border issues)	ARA	P, IO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-4-

LIMITED OFFICIAL USEPanama

1. Political Affairs	ARA	P
2. Economic Affairs (including debt situation)	ARA	P, EB, E
3. Canal Treaty Implementation	ARA	P, L
4. Contadora	ARA	P, IO

Nicaragua

1. UNO/Armed Resistance	ARA	P, PM
2. Support for Terrorism and Subversion in Central America	ARA	P, M/CTP
3. Internal Political Opposition	ARA	P
4. Economic Developments (including debt situation)	ARA	P, EB, E
5. International Relations (including Soviet/Cuban support)	ARA	P

Costa Rica

1. Elections	ARA	P
2. Economic Developments (including U.S. aid, and debt situation)	ARA	P, EB, E, AID
3. Nicaraguan/Costa Rican Relations	ARA	P

REGIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. Central American Common Market	ARA	P, EB, E
2. Central American Economic Initiative	ARA	P, EB, E
3. CBI - Impact on each country	ARA	P, EB, E
4. Regional Debt Situation	S/P	ARA, EB, E

VI. PRESS POINTS: ARA should prepare separate Press Points for Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Guatemala. Press Points must not exceed one page in length, and should follow the standard format (sample attached). They must be cleared by S/P and PA and are due in S/S-S by COB October 29.

VII. PUBLIC STATEMENTS: ARA should work with the Embassies involved to prepare any necessary public statements or toasts, and contingency arrival and departure statements for Mr. Whitehead's use. These should be double spaced on plain bond paper. Pages should not end in the middle of a sentence.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

-5-

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE


Draft remarks should incorporate as much factual and substantive material as possible. They must be cleared with S/P and PA at a minimum, and are due in S/S-S by COB October 29.

VIII. ECONOMIC DATA SHEETS: There should be particular emphasis placed on the quality, relevance and conciseness of economic data sheets. ARA should prepare Economic Data Sheets for Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Guatemala. The data sheets are limited to one page (sample attached), and are due in S/S-S by COB October 29.

IX. BACKGROUND NOTES: PA should provide Background Notes on Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica and Guatemala to the S/S-S action officer by COB October 25.

X. BIOGRAPHIC MATERIAL: S/S-S will request appropriate biographic material. ARA should provide the S/S-S action officer with a list of significant Honduran, Salvadoran, Costa Rican and Guatemalan officials Mr. Whitehead is likely to encounter by NOON October 18.

NOTE: S/S-S requires the original (unstapled) and one copy of all papers requested. Drafting and clearing information should always appear on a separate page. Papers for the visit should be delivered directly to the S/S-S action officer or duty officer, and should not be logged in with S/S-I.


Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
As Stated

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

LIST OF DUE DATES

October 18	Biographic Material
October 25	Country Scope Papers Fact Sheets Background Notes
October 28	Briefing Memoranda
October 29	Schedule Press Points Public Statements Economic Data Sheets



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

S/S

SAMPLE

TO: The Deputy Secretary

FROM: NEA - Richard W. Murphy / \

SUBJECT: Scope Paper: Your October 7-8 Visit to India

I. Objectives

1. Further the high-level dialogue that has sustained the positive trend in Indo-U.S. relations.
2. Promote progress in specific economic and commercial areas and encourage a positive GOI posture towards the new GATT round.
3. Welcome growing Indo-US law enforcement cooperation on Sikh extremism, while reiterating strong US opposition to Sikh separatism.
4. Restate our support for improved Indo-Pak relations and respond to GOI concerns on U.S. arms sales to Pakistan and follow-on program.

II. Where Does the Relationship Stand?

The positive trend in Indo-U.S. relations continues as we seek to build on Rajiv Gandhi's highly successful official visit to Washington. Our strategy for improving relations with India is essentially threefold:

-- Promote a continuous high-level dialogue aimed at deepening mutual understanding and confidence in our respective policies and objectives, while identifying areas where we can productively work together. Your visit extends this dialogue, which in recent months has included Rajiv Gandhi's talks in Washington, the August visit of senior Indian Defense official Arunachalam, and Under Secretary Armacost and Deputy Assistant to the President Fortier's September visit to New Delhi.

-- Pursue initiatives in those areas offering the greatest promise, particularly trade, investment and scientific cooperation. Our agreement with India on a technology transfer MOU and nuclear end-use assurances has allowed us to expedite the export licensing process for certain high-tech. We have also taken the first

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

-2-

steps in expanding a defense sales relationship. We are pressing for GOI agreement to a Binational Rupee Fund which would endow a permanent fund for continuation of long-standing study/exchange programs in the areas of science, technology, education and culture. Our technology exports to India are on the upswing and prospects are improving for GOI approval (over French competition) of a half billion dollar Control Data Corporation sale. Conversely, it appears that Boeing has now lost out to the European Airbus for a similarly large contract.

-- Minimize inevitable frictions in those areas where we differ, e.g., U.S. arms sales to Pakistan, US handling of the Sikh issue, India's U.N. voting patterns and the issue of Indian access to the IDA and ADB. This is our most difficult objective. There is a widely held belief within the GOI that the U.S. does not value close relations with India and, based on Indian perceptions of our actions during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars, that we will inevitably sacrifice India's interests in favor of Pakistan or China. Also, the GOI perceives a distinct anti-Indian bias in our MDB policies. Through patient dialogue and positive action in areas where we can be helpful to the Indians, we have attempted to deal with these perceptions head-on and allay them whenever possible.

The Indians appear pleased with the current direction and pace of Indo-U.S. relations. Distrust of Pakistan remains a potent factor, but Rajiv has decided, at least for the present, to put the US-Pak security relationship into perspective and to play down previous accusations that US aid to Pakistan is a major challenge to India's security interests. We have stressed our desire to have good relations with both Pakistan and India and sought to demonstrate that our policies can contribute to the goals of economic development and stability shared by all regional nations. India continues to be sensitive to any U.S. assumption of a lead role in managing bilateral problems in the region, including the potentially volatile nuclear issue.

Political ferment in Punjab, a strategic border state, has fueled GOI allegations that Islamabad has a hand in the turmoil. Like the nuclear issue, Indian perceptions of Pakistani involvement in the Punjab problem could quickly derail the recent forward movement in the Indo-Pak dialogue.

III. What do we want?

SECRET

SECRET

-3-

- A more balanced Indian posture between the superpowers.
- Deepening of Indo-U.S. ties in non-political areas, including expansion of Indo-U.S. commercial, technological, scientific, defense sales, and people-to-people relations.
- Expanded bilateral cooperation with India on terrorism, including but not limited to the Sikh extremist problem.
- Productive Indo-Pak dialogue aimed at reducing tensions in the region and, in particular, on resolving the nuclear issue.
- More active Indian role in seeking a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan, based on recognition that a Soviet withdrawal is in India's strategic interests.
- Continued Indian efforts to lower tensions with India's regional neighbors, including perseverance in Rajiv Gandhi's bold Sri Lankan initiative.

IV. What do they want?

- Recognition of India's regional leadership and its emerging global importance.
- Assured access to U.S. commercial and military technology.
- A more forthcoming U.S. position on India's concessionary borrowing from IDA and ADB; increased American investment in India.
- U.S. pressure on Pakistan to delay or halt Islamabad's nuclear program.
- Reduction in U.S.-Pakistan political and military ties.
- Reciprocal U.S. and Soviet action to end outside intervention in Afghanistan, leading to the reduction of superpower presence in the northwest quadrant of the subcontinent.
- U.S. pressure on Sri Lanka to compromise on the Tamil-Sinhalese communal problem.

V. What Can We Achieve in this Visit?

You will find intense interest in the U.S.-Soviet exchange leading up to the November summit, and an eagerness to

SECRET

SECRET-4-

hear political-level exposition of our strategy and expectations. Rajiv has tended to see more merit in Soviet positions on arms control, especially in regard to SDI; we have made some progress in getting across our views, and you can continue the effort to convince Indian officials of our seriousness.

Your talks also provide a particularly good opportunity to advance U.S. commercial interests, an area of considerable promise in the growing Indo-U.S. relationship. Your expertise in finance and business is known and respected and the Indians will welcome your comments on American business views on doing business in India. (Rajiv recently exclaimed publicly that one of his biggest problems was the restructuring and streamlining of the Indian bureaucracy in ways that would encourage business investment, rather than hinder it.) There are also a number of areas where we desire Indian action. Ambassador Dean will give the latest state of play on the CDC, Boeing and telecommunications contracts, all facing tough French competition. You can also nudge the Indians once more on providing a modified import license, as specified in the Tech Transfer MOU implementing procedures. Until this takes place, further expeditious handling of Indian export cases will not be possible.

You can encourage the Indians to drop opposition to the new GATT round. The other major third world holdout, Brazil, seems to be modifying its earlier opposition to including services in the new round.

Our determination to combat Sikh terrorism significantly assists our efforts to improve relations with India. You can congratulate the Indians on the successful elections in Punjab in the face of Sikh extremist violence. Drawing on the Sikh terrorism paper, you can review the increasingly effective cooperation between our law enforcement agencies. The Indians will welcome the news of INS' refusal, on foreign policy grounds, of Sikh activist Bhullar Singh's application for a visa adjustment, and the Service's initiation of deportation proceedings against him.

SECRET



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

SAMPLE

SEP 14 1985

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

SECRET

TO: The Secretary

FROM: AF - Chester A. Crocker *CAC*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with Mozambican President Samora Machel,
Wednesday, September 18, 2:15 PM

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS

o Improvement made possible by concrete Mozambican actions:

- Nkomati accord with South Africa, expulsion of ANC militants
- cooperation on regional peace efforts
- opening to West economically--joined IMF and IBRD, encouraged Western investment, readiness to cooperate in deep-cutting economic reforms
- kept pledge not to allow Soviet bases

o Points to make:

- importance of using this visit to answer Mozambique's domestic critics
- stress domestic criticism President faces and warn Machel to be frank, choose his words carefully and avoid traps of U.S. partisan politics
- express pleasure progress we have made since 1982 when you met Foreign Minister Chissano; express your admiration for risks he took to achieve Nkomati. Both of us have made progress in disarming our domestic critics
- state firmly our intention to work closely with Machel for a Namibia/Angola settlement, to influence a black political agenda in South Africa and to stabilize his country. Wish to use this visit to intensify ties - economic reform planning and [redacted] are examples

SECRET
DECL: OADR

SAMPLE

25X1

- 2 -

- stress importance of dealing with symbolic irritants in our relationship - especially perception of Mozambican hostility in U.N.; closer consultations and cooperation required. Mozambican agreement to a ship visit would also send the right signal.

II. REGIONAL ISSUES

- o Machel wants to help in Angola/Namibia negotiations
 - his interests are served by getting South Africans focussed on negotiations, not force
 - progress in Angola/Namibia context would give greater respectability to Nkomati
 - his advance team indicates Machel is ready to open doors for us in Luanda
- o Points to make:
 - appreciate your involvement in efforts secure regional security and get Namibian independence
 - believe discrete discussions between your representatives and those of Dos Santos could help pave way
 - have asked Chet Crocker to work closely with your people to design a practical agenda

III. SOUTH AFRICA AND SANCTIONS

- o Machel does not like sanctions
 - knows they will hurt his country
 - will probably say so when issue comes up
 - but faces political problem flatly opposing them
 - may say international community should not impose unless prepared help Mozambique and others offset the costs
 - may outline Front Line thinking on South Africa as a result of September 15 Maputo Summit

SECRET

- 3 -

o Points to make:

- President's decision on sanctions sends clear message to South Africans change needed now
- at same time keeps U.S. involved, gives us position use influence for reform
- President intends stay involved, wants to know leaders in region want it
- you will be pushed for position on sanctions, hotly debated U.S. domestic issue
- keep in mind sanctions which decrease U.S. influence will not help get change in South Africa
- more importantly, we will press SAG to reform but need Mozambican and responsible independent African thinking on how to shape a black South African response
- black posturing is not enough. Seek Machel's ideas as to how to organize a creative black response and steer negotiations. State we want to work with him, Kaunda and others.

IV. INSURGENCY IN MOZAMBIQUE

o Machel faces dangerous, widespread insurgency

- he refers to them as "armed bandits", claims only outside support keeps them going; in essence he knows he has a hard political problem and wants to get the upper hand on the battlefield before he negotiates
- recurrent attacks on civilians and great damage to economic infrastructure
- he wants our condemnation of what he sees as terrorist acts
- neither government nor insurgents taking creative political steps to find peaceful solution
- avoid giving impression we are pushing him prematurely into a negotiation or taking steps which will undercut his political position

SECRET

FACT SHEET

- purpose: to provide factual background information in a concise format.
- format: one page, using headings in logical progression, with bullets for main points and ticks for subsidiary points under each heading. Should provide principal a concise overview of the issue discussed, including where it stands and what we should do about it. Incomplete, telegraphic sentences preferred.
- uses: mostly briefing books. Fact sheets are a condensed version of the background papers earlier provided for trips, visits, testimony and to the White House. Topics covered range from the general, e.g. "US-British Relations" to the very specific, e.g. "Israeli Cabinet Formation".

SAMPLE

FACT SHEET: HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENTI. HUSSEIN-ARAFAT DIALOGUE

- o At Nov. PNC in Amman, Hussein openly challenged the PLO to accept UNSC Res. 242 & abandon call for independent Palestinian state.
- o Hussein needs Palestinian support for direct negotiations with Israel on West Bank & Gaza.
- o The Jordan-PLO dialogue produced a document, agreed to in mid-Feb.; different texts & interpretations exist, but basic points are:
 - "land for peace formula," but no explicit acceptance of UNSC 242
 - Palestinian self-determination w/i confederation with Jordan, including two states of Jordan & Palestine
 - Solving Palestinian refugee problem per UN resolutions
 - Solving all aspects of Palestine question
 - International conference with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation

II. REGIONAL REACTION

- o Mubarak has termed Hussein/Arafat agree't a step forward and suggested a U.S.-hosted preparatory talks betwn Israel & Jordan-Palestinian delegation.
- o Peres has reacted skeptically, but welcomed Mubarak call for direct talks between Israel & Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (no PLO).

III. U.S. POSITION

- o U.S. ready to support direct talks; remains opposed to international conference.
- o U.S. termed Hussein/Arafat agree't positive if it facilitates Jordanian entry into negotiations.
- o U.S. supports Palestinian participation at every stage of peace process; remains committed to Sept. 1 initiative.
- o U.S. will not recognize or negotiate with PLO until PLO:
 - recognizes Israel's right to exist, and
 - recognizes UNSC Res. 242 & 338

IV. KEY QUESTION

- o Are Jordan and Palestinians ready to enter into direct negotiations with Israel on basis of UNSC Res. 242?

Press Points: Central America

SAMPLE

Basic Message

Our Central America policy of support for democracy and dialogue is working. First Reagan term progress needs to be consolidated in second. El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala are joining Costa Rica as democratic societies. The Sandinistas are preventing Nicaragua from joining the trend.

Our Objectives

- Successful diplomacy in Central America requires that we sustain the entire economic and military assistance program proposed by the President.

Democracy

- Trend is strongly toward democratic reformist regimes.
- El Salvador situation improved markedly -- decline in political violence, economy growing, strict rules on serial bombardment.
- Honduras consolidating democratic rule.
- Democracy making a beginning in Guatemala.

Nicaragua

- Only in Nicaragua has clock been set back -- Sandinistas intent on establishing one-party state, with same apparatus of repression found in other totalitarian states.
- Events since sham elections -- censorship increased, forced relocation of peasants, detention of leading opposition figure -- show real Nicaraguan intentions.
- Rejection of March 3 San Jose opposition manifesto is setback to peace.
- Repression and control of labor and press, militarization of society on Cuban model continue.
- U.S. has moral obligation to help Nicaraguan opposition. Experience shows pressure on Sandinistas contributes to negotiations and regional stability.

Contadora

- Contadora has come through a rough period caused by Nicaraguan intransigence in asylum dispute, now ready to resume.
- Key question -- is Nicaragua willing to negotiate?

SAMPLE

Revised: 9/18/85

Wang 3024C

SAMPLE

	1981	1982	1983	1984 E	1985 E
1. ECONOMIC INDICATORS:					
1a. Population (Midyear, Million)	695	708	725	740	755
1b. Official Unemployment Rate (percent)	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.
1c. Gross Domestic Product (\$ billion)	162	171	176	189	196
1d. GDP Per Capita (\$)	233	241	242	242	259
1e. Investment/GDP Ratio (percent)	24.6	24.7	24.1	25	25
1f. Real GDP (percent change)	3.6	4.6	4.6	7.4	4.0
1g. Real GDP Per Capita (percent change)	1.5	2.5	2.5	5.1	1.9
1h. Inflation Rate	11.4	12.5	7.8	12.6	8
2. FISCAL INDICATORS:					
2a. Public Sector Revenues as Percent of GDP	19.6	20.7	22.0	22.1	22.6
2b. Public Sector Expenditures as PCT of GDP	28.9	29.4	32.1	32.5	32.4
2c. Public Sector Balance as Percent of GDP	9.3	8.7	10.1	10.4	9.8
3. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS:					
3a. Exports to U.S. (\$ billion)	1.2	1.4	2.2	2.5	2.5
3b. Imports from U.S. (\$ billion)	1.7	1.6	1.8	1.6	1.3
3c. Total Exports (\$ billion)	8.5	8.5	8.3	8.4	8.7
3d. Total Imports (\$ billion)	16.2	15.3	14.3	14.0	14.5
3e. Merchandise Trade Balance (\$ billion)	-7.7	-9.8	-6.0	-5.6	-5.8
3f. Current Account Balance (\$ billion)	-3.0	-3.1	-2.9	-2.5	-2.5
4. EXTERNAL DEBT					
4a. Gross External Debt (\$ billion)	14.6	17.2	21.0	24.2	27.0
4b. Gross External Debt Per Capita (\$)	21	24	29	33	36
4c. Debt Service Paid (\$ billion)	1.1	1.3	1.8	2.1	2.4
4d. Debt Service as Percent of Current Receipts	8.5	9.3	11.3	14.0	17.0
4e. Gross Debt as Percent of GDP	11.8	12.2	14.2	14.7	15.3
5. U.S. BILATERAL AID, by Fiscal Year					
5a. Economic Assistance (\$ million)	275	222	212	203	176

SAMPLE